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A common method for investigating pragmatic processing and its development in children 
is to have participants make binary judgments of underinformative (UI) statements such 
as Some elephants are mammals. Rejection of such statements indicates that a (not-all) 
scalar implicature has been computed. Acceptance of UI statements is typically taken as 
evidence that the perceiver has not computed an implicature. Under this assumption, the 
results of binary judgment studies in children and adults suggest that computing an 
implicature may be cognitively costly. For instance, children under 7 years of age are 
systematically more likely to accept UI statements compared to adults. This makes sense if 
children have fewer processing resources than adults. However, Katsos and Bishop (2011) 
found that young children are able to detect violations of informativeness when given 
graded rather than binary response options. They propose that children simply have a 
greater tolerance for pragmatic violations than do adults. The present work examines 
whether this pragmatic tolerance plays a role in adult binary judgment tasks. We manipulated 
social attributes of a speaker in an attempt to influence how accepting a perceiver might 
be of the speaker’s utterances. This manipulation affected acceptability rates for binary 
judgments (Experiment 1) but not for graded judgments (Experiment 2). These results 
raise concerns about the widespread use of binary choice tasks for investigating pragmatic 
processing and undermine the existing evidence suggesting that computing scalar 
implicatures is costly.
Keywords: language, pragmatics, inference, pragmatic tolerance, scalar implicature, truth value judgment, 
social cognition
INTRODUCTION
Much of what we  communicate in conversation is implicit. For example, if a speaker says, 
“Some of the students passed the test,” comprehenders often infer that not all of the students 
passed. This is a pragmatic inference. It arises because communication is typically cooperative. 
Cooperative speakers should, among other things, make the strongest statement compatible 
with their knowledge. This follows from the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975). The speaker 
chose a relatively vague expression (some) rather than a more specific one (all). The comprehender 
can thus infer that the speaker was not in a position to use the more informative expression. 
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This frequently leads to the inference that a stronger statement 
(All of the students passed the test) is false.
This is an example of a scalar implicature (Horn, 1972). In 
recent years, scalar implicatures have become a central testing 
ground for investigating how implicit meanings are computed 
and how pragmatic communication abilities develop. To explore 
these issues, researchers frequently ask participants to judge 
underinformative (UI) statements such as Some elephants are 
mammals (see Katsos and Cummins, 2012 for a review). These 
utterances are literally true, but their implicit not-all meaning 
is false. The rejection of a UI statement in a binary sentence 
acceptability judgment task is thought to indicate that a pragmatic 
inference has been computed. Acceptance is taken as an 
indication that only a literal interpretation has been computed.
There is considerable variation across individuals and situations 
in judgments for UI statements. Studies report that anywhere 
from 23 to 83% of adult respondents judge such sentences 
false depending on various factors (see Dieussaert et  al., 2011 
for review). One important factor appears to be  cognitive 
processing resources. Participants take longer to judge UI 
statements as false rather than true. This is consistent with 
the notion that participants initially compute the literal meaning 
of UIs before engaging in an effortful second stage process 
of computing the pragmatic meaning. In support, when 
participants are given less time to respond (Bott and Noveck, 
2004; Bott et al., 2012) or are asked to do a secondary memory 
task (De Neys and Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert et  al., 2011; 
Marty and Chemla, 2013) the acceptance rate of UI statements 
increases, but not the acceptance rates for patently true or 
false statements (e.g., All elephants are mammals, Some elephants 
are reptiles). Further, individuals with smaller working memory 
capacity exhibit greater acceptance of UI sentences (Feeney 
et  al., 2004; Dieussaert et  al., 2011). Acceptance rates also 
decrease when a larger proportion of stimuli are UI statements 
or when alternative utterances are made more salient (Foppolo 
et al., 2012). Both of these manipulations should make it easier 
to make the comparisons necessary to generate the inference. 
These results are anticipated if computing scalar inferences 
requires time and cognitive resources.
In contrast to adult response patterns, developmental studies 
on the acquisition of scalar inference report that children under 
7-years-old reliably accept UI statements.1 This has led many 
researchers to conclude that young children lack the cognitive 
resources or the pragmatic competence to derive conversational 
inferences at adult-like levels (see Noveck and Reboul, 2008). 
However, studies that do not use judgment tasks generally 
indicate that young children can generate scalar implicatures. 
Pouscoulous et  al. (2007) asked children to perform an act 
out task to make a display of boxes accurately conform to a 
statement. In a situation where five of five boxes contained a 
token, the experimenter said, “I would like some of the boxes 
to contain a token.” Nearly 70% of 4-year-olds removed a coin 
from at least one of the boxes. This strongly suggests that 
they generated a not all implicature. Similar evidence was found 
1 This is true regardless of whether the task is a statement evaluation task 
or a truth value judgment (see Foppolo et  al., 2012).
by (Horowitz et al., 2018; Experiment 2) using a referential 
identification task. The experimenter said, “On the cover of 
my book, some of the pictures are cats.” Children as young 
as 4.5  years old reliably selected a book for which two of 
four pictures were cats more often than a book for which 
four of four pictures were cats.
Katsos and Bishop (2011; see also Veenstra et  al., 2018) 
propose that the acceptance of pragmatically infelicitous 
statements in binary judgment tasks may reflect a greater 
tolerance of pragmatic violations rather than a lack of pragmatic 
competence per se. They found that when participants were 
given a ternary rather than binary judgment task (awarding 
a cartoon speaker a “small,” “big,” or “huge” strawberry reward), 
5- to 6-year-old children and adults were both sensitive to 
informativity (i.e., they gave UI statements a smaller reward 
than optimally informative statements such as Some mammals 
are elephants) and tolerant of pragmatic violations (i.e., they 
gave UI statements a bigger reward than false statements). In 
a separate study, they replicated the typical pattern whereby 
children at this age systematically accept UI statements in a 
binary judgment task. Katsos and Bishop concluded that children 
do in fact detect violations of informativity for UI statements, 
but do not consider these pragmatic violations grave enough 
to warrant outright rejection in a binary choice task. In other 
words, children may in general be more charitable and forgiving 
in binary judgment tasks than adults.
Note that recognizing UI statements as underinformative 
requires computing alternative statements that might have been 
made (such as All elephants are mammals) and determining 
whether any of these alternatives are more optimally informative 
than what was actually said. These are precisely the steps 
involved in generating a scalar implicature. Indeed, the 
computation of alternatives has been proposed as the primary 
cognitive bottleneck in scalar implicature computation in adults 
and children (Barner et  al., 2011; Marty and Chemla, 2013; 
Tiel and Schaeken, 2017). Katsos and Bishop’s pattern of results 
indicates that children do generate scalar inferences and that 
this is observable when provided with an appropriate response 
scale. This result is thus problematic for the view that children 
lack the cognitive resources or pragmatic skills necessary to 
generate scalar implicatures. It also calls into question the use 
of binary choice scales for investigating scalar implicatures in 
children. The primary goal of the current studies is to examine 
whether pragmatic tolerance might also play a role in binary 
judgment tasks for adults.
A potential issue with binary response options is that they 
artificially constrain the perceivers’ choices. In natural 
conversation, there are many moves available to an interlocutor 
who is asked to judge the validity of a statement. For instance, 
a UI statement might elicit an explanatory qualification (True, 
but incomplete or inappropriate; Not quite) or a request for 
clarification (Do you  mean not all?). Indeed in most 
circumstances, it would be  uncooperative to merely tell the 
speaker that they were right or wrong without providing some 
additional feedback. This is because there are multiple ways 
that a statement can be  infelicitous. It may be  false, off topic, 
vague, suffer from presupposition failure (e.g., The current king 
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of France is bald), or otherwise inapt. A UI statement is neither 
completely true nor false but pragmatically odd. Thus, even 
when an individual computes the scalar inference, making a 
binary judgment compels the perceiver to make a complex 
metalinguistic judgment about where to place the threshold 
for acceptability. This raises the possibility that variability in 
binary response tasks reflects differences in response selection 
processes when faced with two poor options rather than, or 
in addition to, differences in computing a pragmatic inference. 
On this view, we  would anticipate that determining where to 
set the threshold in a binary choice task could be  influenced 
by factors that affect how forgiving the addressee might 
be  toward the speaker’s utterance. This would be  true even 
in cases where these factors are not directly relevant to whether 
an implicature has been generated.
In contrast, a ternary judgment task provides an intermediate 
response option that allows respondents an explicit way to 
signal that UI statements are worse than patently true statements, 
but better than patently false ones. If so, in situations where 
participants are provided with three response options rather 
than two, the intermediate response should be  favored (ala 
Katsos and Bishop, 2011) regardless of the social context or 
cognitive task demands.
Most previous studies of adult UI sentence processing have 
asked participants to make judgments on isolated, context-free 
sentences as stimuli. However, computing a pragmatic inference 
requires that the comprehender recover the communicative 
intentions of a cooperative speaker. With context-free sentences, 
it is unclear what the communicative intentions of the speaker 
might be: some participants may not attempt to compute a 
pragmatic interpretation at all given the lack of social context, 
while others might attempt to attribute particular characteristics 
and intentions to the speaker in order to judge their pragmatic 
felicity. As a result, variability in response judgments could 
be  at least partially due to differences in the social attributions 
that comprehenders covertly ascribe to the disembodied speaker. 
In an attempt to control this potential aspect of variability, the 
studies below provide rich communicative contexts with clear 
goals within which participants are asked to make their judgments.
Furthermore, we  hypothesized that social attributes of the 
speaker might influence how tolerant the perceiver is of the 
speaker’s utterance. For example, people may be  more tolerant 
of pragmatic violations from speakers they consider to be more 
likeable. While such attributes do not change the fundamental 
communicative task and hence should not affect whether an 
implicature has been drawn, they may make the participant 
more or less accepting of the speaker’s utterances. The experiments 
below directly test this hypothesis by manipulating the social 
attributes of the speaker. If variability in binary choice tasks 
reflects response selection processes rather than different rates 
of implicature computation, then this social manipulation will 
have a greater effect on judgments of UI statements when 
using a binary scale (Experiment 1) than when using a ternary 
scale (Experiment 2). In sum, we  are interested in whether 
pragmatic tolerance is affected by social attributes of the speaker, 
a manipulation that should not directly affect implicature 
computation per se.
EXPERIMENT 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to test whether attributes of 
the speaker that are not directly related to the communicative 
task can affect adult comprehenders’ tolerance for pragmatic 
violations in a binary judgment task. Participants were provided 
with a specific social context. They were assigned to tutor an 
8-year-old boy on a biology exam on which he  was asked to 
create quantified statements involving animal species and classes. 
This task provides a plausible cover story for why the speaker 
might make UI and patently false statements. It also makes 
clear the purpose of his utterances and the perceiver’s role in 
the communication. Participants were given a brief description 
of the student as a Sympathetic, Unsympathetic, or Non-native 
English-speaking child. The Sympathetic speaker was described as 
kind and adorable. The Unsympathetic speaker was depicted 
as cruel and obnoxious. The Non-native speaker was described 
as speaking English as a foreign language. Importantly, his 
native language was described as lacking quantifiers.
The aim of this speaker manipulation was to create differing 
social contexts that might influence adults into being more 
or less charitable with their judgments of the speaker’s pragmatic 
violations. For instance, previous work has shown that individuals 
who are perceived as more likeable receive higher scores on 
performance assessments in various situations (e.g., Sonnentag, 
1998). It was expected that the Sympathetic speaker condition 
would elicit greater charitability from participants. This in turn 
might engender increased tolerance for pragmatic infelicity 
relative to the Unsympathetic condition. The Non-native speaker 
was included to potentially increase the rate of rejections by 
providing social motivation to focus specifically on the appropriate 
use of quantifiers. Since participants were told that Bobby’s 
native tongue lacks words for specifying quantities, they may 
have elected to pay special attention to his use of quantifiers 
in order to help him. This could have led to decreased tolerance 
for using some when all would have been more informative 
compared with the other speaker conditions.
Though speaker type was manipulated between subjects by 
altering the introductory text, the stimuli, feedback options, 
and core judgment task were identical for all participants. UI 
statements in this test-taking context are less optimally 
informative than a potential alternative statement for all three 
speaker types. Thus, we should anticipate that implicature rates 
are similar across the different speakers. If the rate of rejections 
is different across speakers, this would be  evidence that binary 
judgments are driven by processes other than implicature 
calculation per se.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 102 English-speaking adults were recruited to 
participate in an online questionnaire through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk in exchange for $0.60. Participants were 
restricted to those living in the United States, who had completed 
at least 100 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), and who had 
an excellent performance record on previous HITs (minimum 
97% approval rating). The survey was implemented and hosted 
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on Qualtrics. Four participants failed to submit their data at 
the end of the survey.
Stimuli
A total of 120 categorical statements were constructed in 6 
sentence types, with 20 statements per type (Table 1). All 
statements contained a quantifier (all or some) followed by a 
subset-superset relationship that paired an animal exemplar 
(subset) with an animal category (superset). Critical items (UI) 
were literally true but pragmatically false. Thus, acceptability 
judgments for such items had no correct or incorrect answer. 
The remaining sentence types were fillers that described either 
patently true or patently false subset-superset relations. Ten 
counterbalanced lists were constructed from these materials 
such that each list contained ten UI items and ten filler items 
(two items each of sentence types F1–F5), and no exemplar 
from a category was used more than once per list. Thus, each 
list contained 50% UI statements. This proportion has been 
shown to elicit a high percentage of pragmatic responses in 
adults (Dieussaert et  al., 2011).
Instructions
Three parallel sets of instructions were created. They differed 
only in their characterization of the speaker. All participants 
saw the following: “Imagine that you  have been assigned as 
a tutor to a young student named Bobby. Bobby is currently 
studying basic biology. He has just taken a test in which he had 
to make true sentences out of animal names, animal traits 
and amount words (‘some,’ ‘all,’ ‘none’). While he  has a solid 
understanding of the animals he studied in class, he has trouble 
forming appropriate sentences to communicate his knowledge. 
Your task is to go over each item of the test with Bobby, tell 
him how he  did, and to provide additional feedback to help 
him create better sentences.” Participants then read one of the 
following descriptions:
 1. Sympathetic speaker. “Bobby’s teacher has told you that Bobby 
is an adorable, funny, outgoing, 8-year-old boy with an 
unfortunate developmental disorder. Like most children with 
this disorder, Bobby is eager to interact socially with the 
people around him but he is hindered with significant speech 
and language delays. Although Bobby is now a reasonably 
good communicator, he  still lags significantly behind his 
age-matched peers.”
 2. Unsympathetic speaker. “Bobby’s teacher has told you that 
Bobby is a very difficult and obnoxious 8-year-old boy 
who is often suspended from school because of his 
repeated violent outbursts. For example, he recently broke 
a 5-year-old girl’s arm and then laughed at her while 
she cried. His teachers have told you  that Bobby learns 
best when given clear and direct feedback on tests 
and assignments.”
 3. Non-native speaker. “Bobby’s teacher has told you that Bobby 
is a bright, friendly, 8-year-old boy from Brazil who speaks 
Gazuungu, an Amazonian language that is known for a 
number of unusual features. In particular, Gazuungu has 
no ‘amount words’ for generic quantities less than 10, so 
it has no equivalents for English words like ‘some.’ Instead, 
quantities less than 10 must be  described using exact 
numbers. Bobby already knows quite a bit of English but 
he would like to learn to speak it perfectly. Bobby is patient 
and does not mind being corrected because it means 
he  is learning.”
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a speaker condition. 
After the instructions, participants completed two practice items 
(not UI statements). Participants were then randomly assigned 
to one of the 10 stimulus lists. All 20 experimental items were 
presented on a single screen with the order of items randomized 
for each participant. Participants responded to each item by 
selecting between two radio buttons labeled “That’s right” and 
“Not quite,” and then provided any additional explanation they 
thought might be  useful for Bobby in a text entry field (e.g., 
“That’s right. Tigers, like other mammals, have fur”). The survey 
took approximately 10–15  min to complete.
Exit Survey
Following the experimental task, participants were given three 
3-option multiple choice questions designed to assess attentiveness 
to the speaker characteristics: (1) How old is Bobby? Options: 
6, 8, 12; (2) How was this student described? Options: Kind, 
Amazonian, Obnoxious; and (3) What subject is he  studying? 
Options: Biology, Mathematics, Geography. Participants were 
then asked to judge how likeable Bobby was on a 7-point 
Likert scale followed by eight demographic questions.
Results
Statistical Methods and Exclusion Criteria
Response data were modeled with logistic mixed effect regression 
using the glmer function in the lme4 package within the 
statistical language R (Bates et  al., 2014b) and all models 
consisted of the maximal participant and item random effects 
structure justified by the data and design (Barr et  al., 2013; 
Bates et  al., 2014a). To render model coefficients more 
interpretable, continuous independent variables were centered 
around their mean and categorically manipulated predictors 
were sum coded. Reported coefficients are in logit units.
Two participants were eliminated for reporting that their age 
of English acquisition was in adulthood (Each learned at 24 or 
older, all other participants learned at age 6 or younger). The 
mean accuracy for responses to filler items (statements type 
TABLE 1 | Examples of sentence types.
Type Example Correct response
F1 All birds are parrots “Not quite”
F2 All cats are birds “Not quite”
F3 All parrots are birds “That’s right”
F4 Some birds are parrots “That’s right”
F5 Some cats are birds “Not quite”
UI Some parrots are birds ?
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F1-F5) was used as a proxy for attentiveness to the task. Three 
participants were excluded for accuracy rates below 70%. The 
remaining 93 participants were relatively evenly distributed across 
speaker conditions (NNon-native = 31; NSympathetic = 28; NUnsympathetic = 34). 
For these participants, mean accuracy rates to filler items were 
high (M = 95%, SE = 8.3%) and did not differ across conditions 
(zs ≪ 1). Responses are depicted in Figure 1.
Judgments of UI Statements
For UI sentences, the rate of rejections was reliably affected 
by speaker type: A maximum likelihood ratio test revealed 
that a model containing speaker type as a fixed effect provided 
a better fit to the data than one without (χ2[2]  =  5.15, 
p  =  0.076). Pairwise comparisons indicated that Non-native 
Bobby was reliably more likely to be  rejected than 
Unsympathetic Bobby (β = 1.93, SE = 0.98, z = 1.97, p < 0.05) 
and marginally more than Sympathetic Bobby (β  =  1.89, 
SE  =  1.01, z  =  1.88, p  =  0.06). There were no differences 
in rejections for Sympathetic and Unsympathetic Bobby 
(z  =  0.09). There were no effects of speaker condition for 
any of the filler sentence categories (all zs  <  1).
Exit Survey Results
Participants were extremely accurate at providing Bobby’s age 
(93.9%), and academic subject (98%). Performance was not 
significantly different across conditions (ts  <  1). However, 
performance was less impressive for remembering the critical 
description of Bobby (79.8%). Only 50% of participants in the 
Unsympathetic condition selected “obnoxious” as the best 
description of Bobby, while the remaining 50% selected “kind.” 
In contrast, 100 and 97% of participants in the Sympathetic 
and Non-native speaker conditions respectively selected the 
appropriate descriptor. It was important to establish that the 
effect of speaker type on UI judgments was driven by participants 
who paid attention to the description. To this end, analyses 
were repeated excluding individuals who provided the wrong 
description for Bobby. When only responders who were attending 
to the key manipulation were considered, the trends observed 
for the whole data set strengthened. A model containing speaker 
type as a fixed effect provided a reliably better fit to the data 
than one without (χ2[2] = 6.6, p < 0.05). Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that Non-native Bobby was significantly more likely 
to be  rejected than either Sympathetic Bobby (β  =  2.83, 
SE  =  1.42, z  =  1.99, p  <  0.05) or Unsympathetic Bobby 
(β  =  2.31, SE  =  1.02, z  =  2.26, p  <  0.05). There were no 
differences in rejections for Sympathetic and Unsympathetic 
Bobby (z  <  1). There were no effects of speaker condition for 
any of the filler sentence categories (all zs  <  1).
Likeability
Surprisingly, participants in the Non-native speaker condition 
rated Bobby significantly less likeable than those in either the 
Unsympathetic (F(1,65)  =  265, p  <  0.001) or Sympathetic 
(F(1,57)  =  249, p  <  0.001) speaker conditions (Non-native: 
M  =  2.24, SE  =  0.19; Unsympathetic: M  =  6.0, SE  =  0.16; 
Sympathetic: M  =  6.21, SE  =  0.17). These differences persisted 
when only participants who correctly recalled the speaker 
description were included in the analysis (ps < 0.001; Non-native: 
M  =  2.16, SE  =  0.17; Unsympathetic: M  =  5.83, SE  =  0.19; 
Sympathetic: M  =  6.21, SE  =  0.17). It was unexpected to find 
that Non-native Bobby was perceived to be  the least likeable 
and that Unsympathetic Bobby was rated nearly as likeable 
as Sympathetic Bobby. We  discuss possible explanations for 
this below.
A mixed effects model with likeability as a predictor of 
rejections fared reliably better than one without (χ2[2]  =  4.3; 
p  <  0.05). The more likeable participants rated Bobby, the 
less likely they were to reject UI statements (β = 0.37, SE = 0.18, 
z  =  2, p  <  0.05). When only participants who accurately 
recalled the description of Bobby were included, the relationship 
between likeability and rejection rate was still present 
(χ2[2]  =  6.2; β  =  0.53, SE  =  0.23, z  =  2.33, p  <  0.05). In 
order to establish whether the effect of likeability was unique 
to UI statements, a model including sentence type (filler vs. 
UI), likeability, and their interaction was fit to the data. A 
model containing the interaction term fared reliably better 
than one without (χ2[1]  =  4.7; β  =  0.3, SE  =  0.14, z  =  2.1, 
FIGURE 1 | Responses to all statement types by speaker condition from Experiment 1. Error bars indicate standard errors.
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p  <  0.05). This was because there were differential effects of 
likeability for different sentence types. Though Bobby’s likeability 
reliably predicted rejections to UI statements, it did not predict 
rejections to any other sentence type (zs  <  0.1). Figure 2 
depicts the different patterns for participants who rated Bobby 
highly unlikable (rated 1 or 2) versus those who rated Bobby 
as more likeable.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that social context 
can modulate adult comprehenders’ tolerance for pragmatic 
violations in a binary judgment task. Findings revealed that 
participants in the Non-native speaker condition rated Bobby 
significantly less likeable than did participants in either the 
Unsympathetic or Sympathetic speaker condition. Moreover, 
participants in the Non-native speaker condition were also 
significantly less likely to accept UI utterances than participants 
in the Unsympathetic or Sympathetic speaker conditions. Finally, 
when collapsing across speaker conditions, results showed that 
participants who strongly disliked Bobby were less likely to 
accept critical UI items than participants who gave Bobby a 
higher likeability rating.
The current design does not allow us to tease apart exactly 
which specific social factors underlie the greater rejection rate 
for UI utterances in the Non-native speaker condition. It could 
be that participants demanded a higher threshold for correctness 
for non-native Bobby because he  was less likeable. It could 
also be that they focused more on the use of quantifiers because 
the instructions highlighted that Bobby’s native language differs 
from English in this dimension. Because likeability was inversely 
correlated with the Non-native speaker condition, we  cannot 
assess the independent contributions of these factors. Regardless, 
the results indicate that social aspects of the task influenced 
binary judgments for UI statements, but this was not observed 
for statements that were patently true or false. This pattern 
of results indicates that binary judgments of UI sentences are 
sensitive to social factors that are not directly relevant to the 
implicature calculation. We  return to possible explanations for 
the surprising likeability results in the Non-native speaker 
condition in the General Discussion.
An unresolved question is how to interpret acceptances. 
Rejections of UI statements putatively indicate that an implicature 
was drawn, but it is not clear whether acceptances entail that 
no implicature was drawn. To investigate this question, 
we  conducted an unplanned exploratory analysis of the text 
responses provided by participants to UI statements. If 
participants generated an implicature, then it would be reasonable 
to correct Bobby by providing a more optimally informative 
statement, thereby cancelling the implicature. For instance, for 
a UI sentence of the form “Some subsets are supersets” a 
participant might have provided the stronger alternative “All 
subsets are supersets.” Responses were coded with respect to 
whether they contained the stronger alternative either explicitly 
or using an elided form (e.g., “All of them are”). Consistent 
with expectations, when participants rejected UI statements, 
they overwhelmingly provided the stronger alternative 
(M  =  85.7% of trials, SE  =  3.1%). There were no reliable 
differences among speaker conditions (Sympathetic: M = 90.4%, 
SE = 4.3%; Unsympathetic: M = 82.4%, SE = 5.9%; Non-native: 
M  =  85.2%, SE  =  5.6%; χ2[2]  =  0.9, p  =  0.9). For acceptances, 
there were fewer strong alternatives provided but still a substantial 
number (M  =  21.1%, SE  =  6.1%). There was no reliable effect 
of speaker condition (Sympathetic: M  =  0.8%, SE  =  0.8%; 
Unsympathetic: M = 21.2%, SE = 9.0%; Non-native: M = 47.5%, 
SE = 16%; χ2[2] = 2.35, p = 0.31). It is possible that participants 
generated implicatures on these trials, though we  cannot 
be  certain. They may have provided the stronger statement 
for reasons unrelated to cancelling an unwarranted implicature. 
At a minimum, we can conclude that in these cases participants 
did not lack the cognitive resources to compute the strong 
alternative or to recognize its relevance to the weaker UI 
utterance. This indicates that participants can accept UI statements 
even in cases where they recognize that there are other more 
optimally informative utterances available.
EXPERIMENT 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test whether speaker likeability 
continues to modulate pragmatic tolerance when participants are 
FIGURE 2 | Responses by Low (1–2) versus High (3–7) speaker likeability from Experiment 1. Note that all analyses in the text were performed with likeability as a 
(non-dichotomized) continuous variable.
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given a ternary rather than binary judgment task. Based on the 
results of Katsos and Bishop (2011), we  predicted that any 
differences in pragmatic tolerance due to the differences in perceived 
speaker likeability would be reduced or eliminated. This is because 
the intermediate response option provides participants with an 
explicit way to convey that UI statements are less than optimal 
but are better than patently false statements. Thus most participants 
on most trials should choose the intermediate response option.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 102 English-speaking adults were recruited via 
Mechanical Turk. Eight failed to submit their data at the end 
of the survey, leaving data from 94 participants for analysis.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli, instructions, procedure, and exit survey were 
identical to those in Experiment 1, with the following exception: 
participants were given three response options instead of two 
(“That’s right,” “Not quite,” “That’s wrong”).
Results and Discussion
Exclusion Criteria
Three participants were removed for indicating that they were 
adults when they learned English (30 or older. All other 
participants were 6 or younger). Filler items were judged incorrect 
if participants responded “That’s Right” to a patently false item 
(F1, F2, F5) or if they failed to respond “That’s Right” to a 
patently true item (F3, F4). Four participants were excluded 
for accuracy below 70%. The remaining participants were 
relatively evenly distributed across the three speaker conditions 
(NNon-native  =  30; NSympathetic  =  32; NUnsympathetic  =  25) and had high 
mean accuracy (M  =  94.9%; SE  =  0.8%) (see Figure 3).
Judgments of UI Statements
As predicted, the inclusion of an intermediate judgment option 
had clear effects on participant responses to UI items: in all 
speaker conditions, participants had a strong preference for 
the intermediate response option (Figure 3). For no other 
sentence type was the intermediate response the preferred 
option. A mixed effect model including speaker type was not 
reliably better at explaining the rate of rejections than one 
without (χ2[2]  =  0.4, p  =  0.82). Speaker type was also not 
related to the rates of acceptances (χ2[2]  =  1, p  =  0.61).
To establish whether speaker type had a reliably smaller 
effect on UI judgments in the ternary task relative to the 
binary task, the rejection data from both Experiments 1 and 
2 were combined and fit to a model crossing experiment and 
speaker type. A model without the interaction of these factors 
fared worse than a model including the interaction (χ2[2] = 4.9, 
p  =  0.087). Thus speaker type had a stronger effect for the 
binary judgment task relative to the ternary judgment task on 
rejection rates. To investigate this interaction further, models 
were fit to subsets of the data consisting of each pair of the 
three speaker conditions. The difference between rejection rates 
in the Non-native and Unsympathetic speaker conditions was 
reliably different across experiments (β  =  2.05, SE  =  0.95, 
z  =  2.17, p  <  0.05). For the Non-native and Sympathetic 
conditions, this difference was marginally reliable across 
experiments (β  =  1.5, SE  =  0.84, z  =  1.83, p  =  0.067). In 
contrast, there was no interaction between speaker type and 
experiment in predicting rejection rates for the Sympathetic 
and Unsympathetic speaker conditions. (z  =  0.59).
For acceptances, a model containing the interaction of 
experiment and speaker type was numerically, but not reliably, 
better at explaining the data than one without (χ2[2]  =  2.8, 
p  =  0.25). When considering just the Non-native and 
Unsympathetic speaker conditions, there was a marginal 
interaction between speaker type and experiment (β  =  0.92, 
SE  =  0.54, z  =  1.7, p  =  0.09). This arose because speaker 
type had a stronger effect on acceptances for the binary 
judgment task than for the ternary judgment task. There was 
no interaction in acceptances between the Non-native and 
Sympathetic speaker conditions across experiments (z  =  0.93). 
Nor was there an interaction in acceptance rates for the 
FIGURE 3 | Responses to all statement types by speaker condition from Experiment 2. Error bars indicate standard errors.
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Unsympathetic and Sympathetic speaker conditions across 
experiments (z  =  0.74).
Exit Survey
Accuracy patterns in Experiment 2 were similar to those 
from Experiment 1. Participants were extremely accurate at 
providing Bobby’s age (91.2%), and academic subject (97.8%). 
Performance did not differ across conditions (ts  <  1). 
Performance was again worse for remembering the critical 
description of Bobby (85.7%). Participants in the Sympathetic 
and Non-native conditions were highly accurate (94.1 and 
100% respectively), but participants in the Unsympathetic 
Bobby condition were much less accurate (57.7%). When 
only data from participants who described Bobby correctly 
were included in the analysis of rejection rates, the pattern 
was similar to results from all participants. Speaker condition 
did not reliably predict rejections (χ2[2]  =  −0.74, p  =  1), 
acceptances (χ2[2] = 0.57, p = 0.75), or intermediate responses 
(χ2[2]  =  1.11, p  =  0.57).
When including just those participants who correctly recalled 
the speaker description, the interactions across experiments 
in rejection and acceptance rates became more apparent. A 
model containing the interaction of experiment and speaker 
type on rejections performed marginally better than a model 
without this term (χ2[2]  =  4.75, p  =  0.09). There was an 
interaction between speaker type and experiment rejection rates 
reliable for the Non-native and Sympathetic speaker conditions 
(β  =  1.83, SE  =  0.89, z  =  2.07, p  <  0.05) and marginal for 
the Non-native and Unsympathetic conditions (β  =  2.16, 
SE  =  1.26, z  =  1.7, p  =  0.08). There was no such interaction 
for the Sympathetic and Unsympathetic speaker conditions 
(z  =  0.01). Thus, the effect of speaker type on rejection rates 
was reliably larger for Experiment 1 with binary response 
options compared to Experiment 2 with ternary response options.
Parallel analyses were performed on acceptances using only 
data from participants who described Bobby correctly. A model 
containing the interaction between speaker type and experiment 
was marginally better than a model that did not contain this 
term (χ2[2]  =  4.9, p  =  0.08). There was an interaction between 
speaker type and experiment when considering just the Non-native 
and Unsympathetic speaker conditions (β  =  1.32, SE  =  0.63, 
z  =  2.11, p  <  0.05). There was a trend toward an interaction for 
the Non-native and Sympathetic speaker conditions across 
experiments (β  =  0.72, SE  =  0.53, z  =  1.35, p  =  0.18). There 
was no interaction across experiments for the Unsympathetic and 
Sympathetic speaker conditions (z  =  0.81). Thus, just as with 
rejections, the effect of speaker type on acceptances was larger 
with binary response options than with ternary response options.
Experiment 2 also replicated the surprising speaker-likeability 
finding from Experiment 1: participants in the Non-native 
speaker condition rated Bobby significantly less likeable than 
did participants in the Unsympathetic or Sympathetic conditions 
(Non-native: M  =  2.10, SE  =  0.23; Unsympathetic: M  =  5.92, 
SE  =  0.23; Sympathetic: M  =  5.76, SE  =  0.20). Exit survey 
results also revealed that only 58% of participants in the 
Unsympathetic condition selected “obnoxious” as the best 
description of Bobby, while the remaining 42% selected “kind.” 
In contrast, 95 and 100% of participants in the Sympathetic 
and Non-native speaker conditions respectively selected the 
appropriate descriptor (see General Discussion for possible 
explanations for this finding).
However, in contrast to the results found with the binary 
judgment task in Experiment 1, likeability had no effect on 
rejections (χ2[2] = 1.08, p = 0.3). There was also no relationship 
between likeability and acceptances (χ2[2]  =  0.17, p  =  0.68). 
When only participants who accurately recalled the description 
of Bobby were included, these patterns were unchanged 
(rejections: χ2[2]  =  0.58, p  =  0.44; acceptances: χ2[2]  =  0.9, 
p  =  0.34). To investigate whether the effect of likeability was 
different for UI and other sentence types (filler vs. UI) an 
interactional analysis was performed. There was a main effect 
of sentence type whereby fillers were rejected more often than 
UI statements (β  =  0.99, SE  =  0.24, z  =  4.06, p  <  0.001). 
There was no effect of likeability (z = 0.88, p = 0.38). Importantly, 
there was no interaction between likeability and sentence type 
in predicting rejections (z  =  0.91, p  =  0.36) nor acceptances 
(z = 0.92, p = 0.36). Thus, unlike Experiment 1 where responses 
to UI items were specifically affected by likeability for binary 
judgments, there was no difference in the (null) effects of 
likeability for ternary judgments (See Figure 4).
FIGURE 4 | Responses by Low (1–2) vs. High (3–7) speaker likeability from Experiment 2. Note that all analyses in the text were performed with likeability as a 
(non-dichotomized) continuous variable.
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Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 indicate that social context did 
not modulate participants’ tolerance for pragmatic violations 
when participants were given an intermediate option in a 
ternary judgment task. In contrast to Experiment 1, the positive 
correlation between speaker likeability and acceptance of critical 
items is eliminated when participants have an intermediate 
response option. This indicates that the locus of social context 
effects in Experiment 1 was in selecting a response (i.e., 
determining what the threshold for rejection is), rather than 
being related to computing the inference.
Experiment 2 also addresses a potential concern with the 
speaker manipulation in Experiment 1. Though the task itself 
is unchanged across speaker conditions, it is still logically 
possible that the manipulation of speaker description somehow 
affected implicature calculation indirectly. For instance, if the 
speaker descriptions fundamentally changed the communicative 
goals of the task in disparate ways. If so, then it is conceivable 
that the results from Experiment 1 reflect differences in 
implicature rates across conditions rather than differences in 
response selection. The results from Experiment 2 rebut this 
interpretation. The rates of implicatures in Experiment 2 (inferred 
from either rejections or acceptances) were not affected by 
speaker condition nor likeability as they were in Experiment 
1. Since the only difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is 
the response options available to participants, this difference 
strongly indicates that implicature processes were unaffected.
Similar exploratory analyses to those in Experiment 1 
were performed on participants’ text feedback. The rate of 
strong alternative statements provided for trials in which 
the participant did not accept the UI statement (both 
intermediate responses and rejections) was similar to 
Experiment 1 (M = 85.0%, SE = 3.1%). There were no reliable 
differences among speaker conditions (Sympathetic: 
M = 82.8%, SE = 5.5%; Unsympathetic: M = 80.5%, SE = 7.6%; 
Non-native: M  =  91.1%, SE  =  4.3%; χ2[2]  =  2.3, p  =  0.32). 
For trials on which the participant accepted the UI statement, 
the rate of feedback containing strong alternative statements 
(M  =  3.8%, SE  =  2.8%) was numerically lower than that 
for acceptances in Experiment 1 (M  =  21.1%). There were 
no reliable differences for different speaker conditions 
(Sympathetic: M = 3.4%, SE = 2.6%; Unsympathetic: M = 0%, 
Non-native: M  =  7.1%, SE  =  7.1%; model unidentifiable). 
One possible explanation for the reduction from Experiment 
1 to 2 is that participants who generated an implicature 
and who wanted to provide corrective feedback for Bobby 
without rejecting his statement could avail themselves of 
the intermediate response in Experiment 2. In Experiment 
1, they would have had to accept the statement.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We set out to test whether manipulating social context can 
modulate adult acceptability judgments of UI utterances. 
We  manipulated the perceived likeability of the speaker by 
providing participants with a specific social context and a 
detailed description of their interlocutor against which they 
were asked to make their judgments. In Experiment 1, participants 
rejected UI utterances from the Non-native speaker more 
frequently than from either the Unsympathetic or Sympathetic 
speakers when given only a binary response option. At the 
same time, participants disliked the Non-native speaker relative 
to the other speakers. This pattern of effects indicates that 
social context can influence pragmatic judgments when 
participants are forced to choose between rejection and 
acceptance. Note that the cognitive task was identical in all 
conditions and participants were randomly assigned to speaker 
conditions. Thus, it is unlikely that participants in the Non-native 
speaker condition had more cognitive resources than those in 
the other conditions. Moreover, participants were equally accurate 
on filler items across conditions. Social factors only influenced 
judgments on the UI items, where the pragmatic and literal 
meanings diverged.
In Experiment 2, the same materials were employed, but 
participants had three response options and could therefore give 
more graded feedback. In this case, the acceptance rate was 
not affected by our social context manipulation. Thus, the positive 
correlation between speaker likeability and acceptance of critical 
items is eliminated when participants have an intermediate 
response option. In this case, participants did not have to 
deliberate over where to place the boundary of acceptability—the 
intermediate response option provided participants with an 
explicit way to signal that UI statements are less than optimal 
but are better than patently false statements.
The relative likeability of the speakers is somewhat surprising. 
We  had predicted that the Unsympathetic speaker condition 
would engender the least amount of charitability from participants. 
However, both experiments found that likeability ratings were 
lowest in the Non-native speaker condition. One possible 
explanation for this unexpected result is that participants were 
displaying ethnocentric tendencies (were prejudiced against 
non-native speakers and/or immigrants). An alternative 
explanation may be  related to the high rate of patently false 
statements (30% of the items) in the experimental design. 
Participants may have been able to rationalize such “poor 
performance” from both the Sympathetic and Unsympathetic 
speakers: Sympathetic Bobby was described as having a 
developmental disorder and Unsympathetic Bobby was described 
as “very difficult.” Non-native Bobby, on the other hand, was 
described as “bright.” This may have led participants in the 
Non-native speaker condition to become more irritated with 
his poor performance. A related finding was also surprising. 
Likeability ratings for Unsympathetic Bobby were not reliably 
different than ratings for Sympathetic Bobby (even among 
participants who correctly remembered unsympathetic Bobby 
being labeled “obnoxious” by his teachers). One possible 
explanation for this finding is that Unsympathetic Bobby may 
have garnered compassion rather than aversion; participants 
may have attributed his poor behavior to external causes (e.g., 
poor parenting) rather than to the child himself. Importantly, 
these issues are tangential to the critical finding. Because these 
manipulations should not directly influence the actual computation 
of a scalar inference, any difference in responses between binary 
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and ternary judgments is better explained by differences in 
response selection processes than by different rates of implicature 
computation. Therefore, we take the current findings as clear 
evidence that social factors unrelated to generating the implicature 
itself can modulate adult comprehenders’ tolerance for pragmatic 
violations in a binary judgment task.
An open question is how to interpret acceptances in the 
present studies. One possibility is that participants in Experiment 
1 recognized that Bobby’s utterance was not optimally informative, 
but decided that this violation was not sufficient to assign it 
the same rating as patently false statements. If so, many of 
these individuals would have likely preferred an intermediate 
option. On this view, we  should have seen a reduction in the 
rate of acceptances in Experiment 2. There were indeed small 
numerical reductions for the Unsympathetic speaker (30.6 vs. 
22.9%) and for the Sympathetic speaker (27.5 vs. 24%) who 
were both deemed likeable, but the rate of acceptances increased 
slightly for the Non-native speakers (13.3 vs. 19%) who were 
deemed unlikeable. However, the overall rate of acceptances 
did not fall dramatically when provided with an intermediate 
option. There are at least two plausible accounts for this. One 
is that there were, by chance, fewer genuine implicatures drawn 
in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1. On this view, 
non-acceptances in the ternary task might more accurately 
reflect implicature generation than rejections in the binary 
task. If so, then the small reduction in acceptances from 
Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 would have been larger if the 
two groups of participants generated implicatures at the same 
rate. A second possibility is that the intermediate responses 
were still too harsh for some individuals who generated 
implicatures. As a result, they elected to accept UI statements 
even with an intermediate option available. In this case, an 
additional intermediate option (e.g., “mostly right”) might have 
revealed still more individuals who are sensitive to 
underinformativity (see Jasbi, Waldon, and Degen, submitted). 
Either of these possibilities, either singly or in combination, 
could have led to the pattern observed.
CONCLUSION
The present studies demonstrate that pragmatic tolerance can 
contribute to the variability found in adult responses to UI 
utterances in binary judgment tasks. Many studies take the 
non-acceptance of a UI statement to be  evidence that the 
comprehender has computed a scalar inference and the acceptance 
of a UI statement as evidence that they have not. The results 
above call these assumptions into question. We  have shown 
that adult comprehenders, like children (Katsos and Bishop, 
2011), will accept a UI statement even in the same situations 
where they recognize it as non-optimal. Unlike patently false 
or true statements, UIs are neither completely wrong nor 
completely correct. When forced to select between two inapt 
options in a binary choice task, social factors can tip the balance 
so that participants choose to reject UI statements more often 
for certain speakers. In contrast, a ternary judgment task allows 
participants to clearly indicate that UI utterances are intermediately 
acceptable between patently true and false statements. With a 
more apt intermediate response option, participants are not as 
affected by social aspects of the speaker. More work is needed 
to establish what aspects of the social context are most influential 
for binary judgments, and to determine why children are less 
likely to reject pragmatically infelicitous statements than adults.
What we  do have evidence for is that binary judgments 
are affected by selection processes, which are unrelated to 
implicature computation, in a way that graded judgments are 
not. Binary judgments are perhaps the most widespread method 
for investigating implicature processing and development. The 
present work thus demonstrates that results garnered from 
binary judgment tasks must be  interpreted with caution.
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